Frank talk and new course of Russian policy
Interview with Dmitry Trenin.
We continue an attempt of comprehension of Russian foreign policy’ particular features with regard to the President Putin’s Munich speech. We conversed about the meaning of said in the large context of Russian-American and Russian-European relations with one of the leading home experts in the field of security and international relations Dmitry Vitalievich Trenin, Deputy Director, Head of Scientific Council of the Carnegie Moscow Centre. Interviewer is Boris Dolgin. The was held before the telephone talk between President of Russia and President of the USA as well as the beginning of the crisis around the British servicemen captured by Iran.
What’s in your opinion was said by Vladimir Putin in Munich?
I think that he has said his mind. He used the conference format and his trip to Munich to say to his critics’ face and first of all to those from the United States (seated in the first row) and their European friends everything he thought of American and Western policy in Russia.
In other words, if to ask oneself about the addressee of the statement was it the Americans and the Europeans?
First and foremost – the Americans. The message sent to the Europeans was another: Putin said many words which made common cause with considerable part of the Europeans. I think that President needed this trip to express his opinion. Many assume it was either the beginning of election campaign in Russia or the will to his own successor. I don’t think that is how matters stand. There was not much new for the Russian audience in his speech, but a lot for to the western one. Putin’s speech is till now the subject of discussions.
It was necessary for him to express his thoughts, but the right place should be found for that. There was no sense to make a statement in Russia, as it would not make any impression on the western audience – as one could say it was for internal use. It’s not very serious and would not make a required effect. To make it during an official visit to another country would mean to run into trouble. President did not need it. To make such a statement during a visit of a foreign leader meant the same and could also overburden the relations. And the conference’s format allows such an intercourse. Putin himself said, it was just a conference, “you can be angry with me and turn on the red light but I’ll tell you everything I think”.
And what it was necessary for? Was there any rational objective?
I think, there was not.
But it was not impromptu. It was known beforehand there would be an important speech, by he has given again advance notice. Is it really such a splash of emotions: “We think so” - and that’s it, without the aim to change anything?
I can just suppose, but may be, he tried in such a way to “clear the air” - to put everything right, to try a clear breast (frank). But I don’t think it was his main motive.
I saw a short fragment of this speech and it seamed to me that Putin was excited. If you read the text (and I’ve made it several times), you will see that it’s not very well prepared and constructed. It’s obvious that some pieces were prepared in advance in chancellery, but the whole structure itself makes us assume, that it was live speech and that a speaker needed to hurl it into face to the people who blamed him. We must not forget, that Putin soon after the summit of “eight” was subjected the strongest fire of criticism due to such events, like Politkovskaya murder, Litvinenko murder, Belorussia’s oil and gas crisis…
But was it a serious fire in this last case?
Concerning Belorussia, perhaps not, but regarding Litvinenko… The regime (and when they say regime they mean “President”) is being accused after all not only to be a criminal regime, but a killing one which eliminates physically its critics.
I think that Putin was in condition of some frustration, he needed to express his thoughts, to set forth his point of view. But in my opinion, he did not mean neither to find favour for Russia with the auditorium no to drive some wedges between western allies, etc. He did not act in common way as most of the politicians do when they build their speech: he did not head for the audience, he did not think about the effect he was making, but about what was in his heart.
Thus, his speech in my view was aimless: Putin did not want to reach anything with this speech, he wanted to express his opinion (to say his mind) and thereby to convert may be the relations into a deeper level.
You mean a deeper emotional level?
Well, there were not only emotions. Accumulated grievances, complaints – all that has been worrying him since long and that he wanted to tell first of all to the Americans.
Not long ago his message was the following: “I came with a frank wish to put our relations on the partner’s basis. I’ve done a lot for that sake: removed the reconnaissance base from Cuba, closed the base in Camrani, did not put a spoke in your wheel in Central Asia, supported you on September 11, did not bat an eyelid on your withdrawal from the PRO Treaty. And what have I receive in return?
But it was last year. Now he is going further. He is speaking about those problems (in the first place about security), which he can see in American policy and speaks sharply about them.
Moreover, his non-acceptance of American policy he puts if not at the ideological, but at the conceptual ground. It’s not a thrust, but the complete logical and political construction, aimed against unipolar world. That is in my view a new circuit of Russian foreign policy.
The point is that Putin spoke in Munich with the West not only as a man striving to become a member of this club. In 2003 during his disputes on Iran’s question he tried to oppose the USA from the position of a western country. France, Germany, Russia – a kind of new fantastic Antanta, in order to restrain a friend who is going too far. Now is another premise.
And another list of countries.
Yes, Russia if you wish takes the part of a spokesman of a new wave. He spoke about China, India and Brazil, i.e. not about the western countries, but about those who are growing, will in the prospect leave behind the Europeans and begin soon to be close on the heels of the USA.
Russia can not certainly (and Putin understands it) pretend on the role of the leader of this group of countries. And the group itself has not been formed. But there is a reality – the non-western countries are developing rather mightily and changing the geopolitical picture of the world.
For a range of reasons none of these countries can or want to challenge to the USA. This niche is for a standard bearer who is not the commander, but keeps the flag in his hands, it’s vacant and Russia seems to plan appear in this position: spokesman of a new, different of the common western point of view on how the world must be arranged. Along with that Putin suppose that a part of the European countries could stand under this flag.
And what are the prospects? Will it work?
It can work, one can quite speak about the things which the other think of, but don’t say.
But standard bearer is not just the person who is raising the banner, but who is leading to the attack. Is it senselessly, if nobody follows him?
Probably, not to the attack. May be this is not quite a precise illustration and the word “standard bearer can” be replaced by anything else. These countries will not advance to the attack, but they will demand the bigger chare in administration and bigger participation of their interests. This question is potentially of principle to me.
It’s only a hypothesis – as Putin did not say us what exactly he had thought – but if it’s right, it means a serious turning point in Russian foreign policy.
That multi-vectors tendency which is much spoken about, has already driven Russia even to not counting itself in the ranks of the West broadly understood. Yes, it participates in “eight”, but exactly like in UN Security Council: it’s quite another character of relations, another than was supposed when Russia had been striving for this role.
Do you have a feeling that it’s already prevalent concept or just an intuitive deviation for a vacant niche?
I think that now concepts are not in a great demand in the Kremlin. We are in general not an ideological country, but “merely concrete”. Evolution of the Russian foreign policy in 2003-2005 – is leaving the western orbit and an attempt of sketching its own. It’s obvious, that Russia must find its position in the world: it’s not enough to say that we have multi-vectors policy, we are on friendly terms with everybody and it’s not of fundamental importance who is our partner, although such rhetoric can be often heard.
If the designated line continues, we can count out from this speech. Russia will associate itself, if you will, with a new world, the world of ascending countries. It will take the part of propagandist, may be organizer.
Nevertheless Russia has a conscious of superiority over other fellows of that new club – even over the great China. It’s really great and is rapidly developing etc, but Russia has more experience, participating in world affairs during last 150 years, Russia has so far the greatest nuclear potential. The Chinese for various reasons will act very carefully, and Russia can pretend for more active role and such role will give her some advantages. That will raise the international status of the country and provide the security for citizens, comprising rich citizens of RF having different interests beyond the borders of the country. And that gives strength.
But the role of standard bearer can bring some dividends only in case, he does not bring matters to confrontation as nobody needs it, it’s no question of that. The question is in motivated disagreement and putting forward an alternative agenda. Russia does not have this, it has only disagreement with the position proposed by Washington administration, and also the questions regarding the European agenda.
As a new agenda the return to the problems of disarmament is put forward.
Yes, but it’s not enough. This is an important question but it can not rival in issues of western agenda: human rights, prevention of humanitarian catastrophes, environment, global warming, problems of democracy in the world, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc - that was declared (announced) to Americans and Europeans as the most important elements of their partly common, partly different agendas.
.All this can not be outweighed by the slogan: “Let’s pay attention to disarmament”. Let’s do. But for Americans the problem of disarmament is not Russia. Speaking about large countries, it’s first of all China, its involvement in disarmament process. The question is whether it wants to disarm. Or the problem of nuclear disarmament in India and Pakistan. What Russia can do about that? Yes, it can suggest that the Soviet-American disarmament agenda should continue and something should be done. Yes, it can suggest that something regarding the outer space should be done and for sure it will suggest. But the main characters here are the USA and China. Russia can be found in the position of a country, that puts forward some initiatives, but no one pays them attention. It does not adorn a country.
Its own serious points to the agenda can be put forward in addition to those proposed by the West; let’s say energy security. It was proposed. But as we can see, the problems of energy security are being solved on the practical level and of that how sometimes even right moves are being put into practice can suffer the image of Russia.
There is a big problem in Russia with modernizing its foreign policy thinking, which in my opinion at the moment continues to be archaic, as well as making more positive contribution into international discussion on global problems. And here I have some doubts, related to the particular intellectual and political features of our elite.
Drift of Russian foreign policy – is it also a change-over from one group of experts to another, from one group of administrators to another or it just turned out so?
If to speak about the people who serve somehow the President’s decisions, then I think, it’s the same group now who has worked with him since 2000. Some concrete people are changing, but in general it’s the same group of persons.
I don’t think that somebody besides President really form Russian foreign policy. A large number of officials realize it and put into practice, but it’s President who forms it taking in account his own and those of his close surroundings conceptions about the place of Russia in the world and mainly about the interests of Russia.
The Russian policy is based more and more on the concrete interests dictating in the context of a definite world outlook a definite policy.
Would you agree with me that one of the messages in Munich was “bargain with us more active”?
Yes, but it’s not quite new. This is one of the more important elements of a new approach being realized lately first of all by Putin.
There was a variant of partnership on the basis of concessions – this was Gorbachev. There was another variant of partnership on the basis of nearly “national betrayal – that was Eltzin. “National betrayal”
means that foreigners were let inside the country and have received here an opportunity to influence it from inside. As to Putin – his partnership is with a great effort, when cooperation is not self-valuable thing, but just a result of successful competition: let’s first measure swards, and then will decide on what basis to cooperate. For this we don’t restrict ourselves in instruments that we use in order to win and will not cooperate with you on your terms – if you want to cooperate with us let’s come to an agreement on equal terms.
And this Putin’s “on equal terms” runs all through. He said, “26 percent of the oil extraction in Russia is done by foreign companies. Show me an example, where Russia got so deep into your economy. It does not exist – so let’s pipe down and will talk on equal terms. We shall not be subject to overall examination while your territory is not accessible for such analysis.
It’s a tough approach, it assume some frictions.
One of the sharp moments in his speech and in the information train – deploying in Europe the elements of the American PRO. Are Russian authorities really so anxious about this fact and Europe and the USA really need it? What make them go to such confrontation from both sides?
If to tell about the Russian authorities, they have decided now, as I think, not to shut eyes to the steps and actions of the USA, which are disliked in Russia and which contradict its interests. They shut their eyes for joining Baltic republics NATO or to the American presence in Central Asia. Now they will be fighting NATO in Ukraine – in Crimea they have already tried, by the way; probably in Georgia too. Another question will be there a positive result for Russia?
Are these just emotions or real alarms?
In my mind, these are just emotions. Of course, there are now real alarms that 10 missiles interceptors in Poland with support RLS in Czechia would be able to stop hypothetic launch of inter-continental missiles in the direction of the USA. At the same time, there is common tendency to comment the American actions as aimed at Russia. In this connection there are exaggerations. For example, the well known Gates’ statement is treated in much more anti-Russian clue, than it was meant. Gates is not a great lawyer of present Russian policy, but what has been done with his speech, pointed at the confrontational if not accusatory bent in the reading of American papers. Any American word or action, reminding of renewal of Russian-American confrontation, are emphasized, boosted and become a subject of discussions and probably counteractions.
A year ago an absolutely incompetent article appeared in the magazine “The Foreign Affairs” concerning the possibility of disarmament by the first strike. It must be clear that this article does not reflect the reality, that it is absurd, etc, that it should have been ignored and the only thing could be advised to the editors for maintaining the image of the magazine – not to publish such authors any more. Instead of that we received a storm, an accusation of Americans that those two
authors wrote what there were in minds of Ramsfeld, Cheiny and probably president Bush. Now is the same thing: if to look at the American efforts in the field of anti-missile defence from the opposite side, with some lively imagination they can be presented as directed against Russia.
Moreover, the Russian authorities tried again to split the Europe and NATO: the Poles and the Czechs with pro-american mood have unpleasant memories about our homeland when it had another name, but the Germans and the French don’t want Russia-German and Russia-French relations were subject to danger due to pollen neuralgia and American couldn't-careless attitude to Russian tender spots, etc. y The polemic had been already provoked inside NATO between Germany and Poland. From the point of view of classical geopolitics, it’s exactly what Russia wants: to insert an element of disagreement to the ranks of its potential partners. It’s necessary for that to put a question point-blank, to make them all think, to put a question of what is more valuable for them and what they need in general.
The excess is evident hereby: Solovtsov’s announcement about aiming Russian missiles, etc. In my mind it’s insanity to speak about that. I understand that all this is not game and that Solovtsov did not invent it – he was ordered to announce in such a way; Foreign minister said that they don’t have such plans – that’s what all military officials think, one can not forbid them to think of the defense of their Motherland.
It’s a game in my view, the result is not in favour of Russia, and the harsh statements did not contribute to the strengthening of Russian positions. As to the contract RSMD, in case of Russia’s withdrawal Russia, the USA will also turn out to be out of this agreement. And if to suppose that on the territory of Poland or Czech will appear not the radars and missiles-interceptors, but missiles similar to Pershing -2 (only to suppose, I understand that the USA will have to pay a big price for that), the threat which the soviet General headquarters considered to be the most awful for the national security - the deployment of missiles in the proximate vicinity of Russian centers of making-decisions and missile base - will be realized. A then the fly-up time 6-8 min, and now one can approach and “land” the missiles in Latvia or Estonia.
The untwist of this fly-wheel can be extremely dangerous for Russian liberal forces.
And what does the USA need these systems for?
If to speak from the point of view of the USA, I think they are rightly attend to the problem of missile security.
On the part of Iran?
Iran among others.
And why the deployment is supposed exactly here and not, let’s say, in Romania or Bulgaria?
There would be good to. And probably also in Turkey. Although there are systems of interception at the starting as well as at the middle sectors of the trajectory.
I think the USA showed their capability for ignoring the Russian tender spots. This decision must have been taken also to support Poland and to become stronger in Czechia.
But will it strengthen them? As a result the society in Czechia, for example, polarized on the principle that had not divided it beforehand. One would like to understand the degree of estimation and the inner logic.
I think that people who prepared these decisions, to put it mildly, don’t consider Russia to be his ally. They have feelings towards Russia similar to those that have many Russians and who consider the USA to be their possible enemy.
Beginning with 2000 the process of forming of All-European system PRO of the theatre of war was going slowly, but steadily. And Russia participated in it along with the Europeans and the USA. The fact that the issue of elements of American PRO was not discussed in friendly atmosphere, pointes to the climate in which the talks were held.
One could talk either about the joint efforts in the field of anti-missile defence or about such actions on the USA’s part, which Russia would not consider as provocative or potentially aimed against Russia. If the missiles would install in Italy, one could say the threat to Russia existed, but was not so great. And Poland is quite another thing both in political and military meaning.
But the question must arise, for example, as to whether it was economically effective spending money on this rather than doing anything else?
The matter is as far as I understand in relatively modest expenses. If you take into consideration how much money is being spent minutely in Iraq – these are incommensurable sums. One must realize that America today is busy with Iraq and ten times again with Iraq, then four positions – Iran, two positions – Afghanistan, then – Pakistan “Al-Kaida” and other international terrorists, then China and India in different ways, then whatever other countries and then only somewhere in the tail-end, may be at the 20-th place there is something connecting to Russia - not very pleasant and not very comprehensible.
The public opinion in America does not think on what effect either one or another action will have on Russia. The Americans are perplexed, as the USA is a peaceful country with genuine valuables (I say it without irony) which needn’t not to be proved and why the other countries,
especially with such a troublesome regime like Russia must interpose veto on something or demand any changes? It’s not against you fellows and you should understand it. That’s why there were no articles before Putin’s speech. After it I read some articles in “The New York Times” and “The Washington Post”, where authors called to look at Russia from the viewpoint of whether the USA’s actions caused in any unnecessary damage to the relations with Russia – the relations which can turn out to be useful.
Is there are any chance, that the Russian discontent will be considered, something will be corrected and there will be any join projects? (interview was taken before the last Putin’s talk with George Bush and disproved later on information related the possibility of deploying the American PRO on the Russian territory – Polit.ru).
There will no be joint projects and I would not proceed from something that will be corrected, but would rather think that these plans will be realized and that certain damage will be caused to everybody: to Russia which will not be able to prevent them, to America which will have less friendly Russia, to Poland including her relationship with Germany and to other counties of the continental Europe, to Czechia… It’s unlikely the Americans will go back on their words. The situation might become sharper and quite different, but then it would be another talk.
How significant was, in your view, the Iran topic in the context of the Munich speech?
I’ve got an impression that the speech was constructed with comprehension of the fact that the USA can strike Iran before the date of term of credentials of the present administration. Putin did not say about this in every paragraph, but it seems to be a prewar speech, where the possibility of strike was considered as real.
Does really Russian administration seriously beware of the war in Iraq? And why?
In my opinion, it bewares of it for one reason: if the USA possessed a capability to cut this nuclear swelling by surgeon strike and let Iran recover and solve its problems, the Russian administration would apprehend it as a resolution of a problem – Russia does not need the nuclear Iran either as the United States.
Russia in this case would make some statements in favour of the collective actions, international law, UN, Defense Council etc, but if the Americans succeeded in solving the Iran’s problem, Russia would most likely be contented. And if at the same time the Iran new administration realized the mistakes of their predecessors, everything then would be perfect.
But it’s naпve to suppose that the situation will be as following: the USA can strike, but the result will be less then success; they will make red-hot the situation in the whole region. On the one hand Russia could be glad that the USA got stuck in the affairs of Middle East, but on the other hand the whole South outskirts of Russian Empire would be destabilized. It would raise the Moslem radical in the whole world, including Russian Federation.
But it would be a bloc of the USA with monarchies of the Gulf…
On the one hand are the Arab monarchies, and on the other hand is the Arab street. How it will play on the Arab East, it’s difficult to say unambiguously, but it’s obvious that an extra problem arises for the neighboring countries including Russia.
Russia will have to decide something, to get into confrontation with the USA on the questions which are not the most important for today. Zone of instability will intensify as well as the Moslem radicalism in the whole world and could be pointed against many different targets, Russia including.
Russia does not nee all these and it needs Iran as a partner in the nuclear field, Russia would like to agree is such a way that it got out of isolation, but not as such degree that to reintegrate into the Western orbit, i.e. that it continued to cooperate with Russia, including the nuclear area.
Yes, that is true, due to the war this Iran the price for oil and gas can rise for some time, but minuses from the point of view of Russian authorities outweigh pluses. They are not so unambiguously cynical to say: “You want to fall into the hole? Then fall in and fracture your legs there”. I think the danger of destabilization is considered as rather serious.
Does any probability to avoid a war still exist?
Yes it exists. The conference of Iraq’s neighbors with Condolisa Rise’s participation is one of the evidences.
And how? Some proposals to Iran have been already placed. To all appearance, they did not make a particular impression.
There are difficulties (factions) at the moment in the Iran administration. From the point of view of Russian authorities, the nuclear Iran is less dangerous than the fight against Iran, which could destabilize among others Pakistan. What Russia is really afraid of is that the nuclear weapon can fall into fundamentalists’ hands, and the Anglo-Americans after a coup in Pakistan will hardly be able to take over the control or neutralize their nuclear arsenals. Such scenario would be linked with the possibility of abrupt strengthening of “Talibad” in Afghanistan and then Russia will receive a problem, which seems to have been solved in 2001.
All this is unpleasant and dangerous for Russia. Where is the issue? But the Americans could have come to the agreement with South Korea.
Yes, but there was a distinct trade field. And how about it here?
Iran needs not so much the nuclear weapons to destroy Israel, as the recognition as regional power. I will tell with practically firm confidence, that President Bush will not take such steps, but if the USA will be ready to acknowledge Iran in such quality, to establish relations and to cancel sanctions, etc. then Iran can make a compromise resulting in continuation of development of his nuclear programme, but on terms which don’t give him possibility to lead this programme in military direction.
I.e the situation can be regulated if the problems which Iran intended to solve with a help of nuclear weapons, it would be able to solve with a help of purchasing the nuclear weapons.
It’s not an acceptable solution for Americans, but if to admit that the new administration decided to come to agreement with Iran, then one will have to accept, that Iran has its own interests.
I hope this part of administration which is presented relatively saying by Condolisa Rise will strive to avoid a war.
What steps on the USA’s part can be expected as a reaction on Munich and what follows it?
First of all, the USA have already reacted upon the speech and reacted very reservedly, deciding not to emphasize it.
The receives a signal from Moscow – it’s an evidence, by the way, that President spoke his mind and did not blurted out. Soon after his statement Dmitry Peskov began to tell, that it was a confrontational speech, many other Russian politicians expressed their opinion; Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov wrote an article published in “The Washington Post” which was rather conciliatory. The USA National Security Advisor Steven Hadly has visited Moscow already after the statement. I think he received in the Kremlin the assurances that Moscow is not seeking any confrontation that is in general true. Drift to the side of new, developing countries is not a warning, but a move caused by new conditions.
Can all this become a reason that the USA more closely watched the interests and built the relations?
I’m afraid to overlook, but strange as it may seem, I see in Washington the readiness for seeking out of the box (search as a counteragent somebody ideal – Polit.ru). It was reveled during the campaign around Litvinenko, when they let to understand that this regime is odious and unpleasant, and it’s necessary to be prepared to restrain this country somehow, as it could be a big problem for everybody. Now there are some signs that they begin to regard Russia more attentively. Lantos’ statements in Moscow don’t mean the question regarding Jackson-Venik amendment has been already resolved, but the designed motivation is very interesting – in order to solve USA’s important problems it’s necessary to change the approach to Russia and don’t to make overstating demands, to reduce the expectation in it’s regard and then it will be possible to come to an agreement. He said in plain text: ”We mustn’t take care of Russian democracy more than the Russians themselves”. It was something fantastic to hear it coming from him, many in the Kremlin expected it, but nobody foreseen. So, something can be expected, although now cautious attitude to Russia still prevails.
