It’s a great comfort, that Yegor Gajdar makes speeches more often in Russia and abroad stating his versions of decay and breakdown of the USSR, suggesting the respective conclusions and lessons for actual Russian situation. Some of Gajdar’s theses seem to me, however, to be not irreproachable with regard to conformity with historical facts and even logic. Tacking into account his fame and authority, this keenly necessary today public discussion can be led aside from the essence of stated issues.
Much depends, of course, on acquired experience and world outlook. I would not presume to act as opponent to so well-informed researcher (or better to say, to a tendency represented by him), if I did not used to deal in my time with state information and with the taking decisions process in some degree. The middle 80s – the beginning 90s I spent just in the analytical department of the KGB reconnaissance, wherefrom the detailed view opened upon the course of events in Russia and abroad. The Kremlin Instance was informing us rather frankly about its current concerns, was charging with elaboration of foreign policy activities and so on. More detailed it’s described in the article in the “Independent military survey” of October 20th, 2006.
The Soviet economy was inedible
As to the world outlook, it can be concluded from the Gajdar’s reasoning relative to the USSR’s fate, that the economic growth is an undoubted weal. Everything else is, per se, strung on this thesis. I don’t agree with such approach in principle, and the matter is not only in ecology. There is another reading-book’s objection: the economic and technological rise of Germany in 30s of the 20th century has resulted in the fact, that when the Germans unleashed the war they were well armed and replete. “Goszakaz” and literal terror, apropos, were getting alone together and were closely interwoven with market elements in the “Third Reich”. Stirlitz (Russian equivalent of James Bond) and his companions in arms made use of small business (that “foothold of democracy”) services, as well as of insurance companies. And the keen criminals – Nazi forced their way to the power under prospering multi-party system and acting electoral institutions, cited by many as nearly the guarantee against the world evil.
Perhaps, I could be easily “sealed” at the last point by the famous aphorism of Winston Churchill that democracy with all its defects is, nevertheless, indispensable. However, the Churchill’s views were in fact much broader. His heritage is full of bright estimations of political culture and basic values of British nation (as well as of the whole “English language”); and democratic procedures, in particular, were set up for their realization and protection.
Margaret Thatcher emphasized in general, that the British during the Cold War defended nothing but their particular “mode of life”. And Alexander Haig justified the war efforts against the Communist block namely by the fact, that there were “things more important then life”. In the performance of my official duty, I tried to go deeper into psychology and motivation of NATO’s figures. I don’t think that energy-security was considered by Haig and his companions in arms to be higher than life.
So that, when Gajdar affirms once again that the main problem of the USSR till the middle of the 80s was in “lowering of economic growth”, it should be specified what kind of economy that was and for what sake it ground raw materials, human resources and ruined natural environment? And how has all this affected the world situation and the USSR’s place in it? And what if it would be weal in those conditions the braking of growth or even slackening of existing economic system? The answers, as it seems, depend on the point of view, adherence to these or other values and even preferences regarding “mode of life”. In any case, the models of growth with theirs imperatives built in were composed for normal, open enough societies and states, but not for national concentration camps and beleaguered fortresses.
Has Gajdar really forgotten that the Soviet economy was aimed mainly at preparation to global and total war, where Moscow planned to strike the first blow? And also to the war, that were already really blazing in different parts of the world and reached it’s most dangerous peak in the 80s? That is the present official propaganda who enjoined that the crushing defeat of the USSR should be forgotten and who is reducing it to the “ineffectiveness of management”. But Gajdar remembers for sure everything. But for whatever reason he is ashamed of positioning himself distinctly regarding global conflict, beyond of which is impossible to understand the “economic policy” of the soviet leadership.
Armament production continued to grow, apropos, in the USSR in those years at a rapid pace (data are open to general use). Huge command posts, bases and aerodromes were constructed and equipped. How and in what measure it’s included in the showings regularly cited by Gajdar and others? And what about the contribution to “defense capacity” of million prisoners and enthusiasts members of Komsomol, is it also included and with which sign? And how still a value of damage caused by the Soviet regime and its military machine to nature, nation’s health, culture and moral can be stated?
There were a lot of constructions in the 80s, the fact in itself can be hardly considered as an indicator of decay. The main question – what were the purpose and in the name of what all this had been done? The essence of the matter, in my view, is expressed in the capacious appraisal by Robert Geitz, Director of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), responsible for the USA security who admitted that the USSR of the period of “stagnation” was “despotism that is working”.
Human element survived itself
One can object to that: but the living standard of an average citizen was extremely low and was even falling down, wasn’t it? Isn’t it an evidence of the system’s worthlessness and crisis?
I had an occasion to visit hundreds of economic objects in many regions of the USSR in the early 80s, to talk to directors, scientists, and common working people. The situation looked catastrophic in many senses. There was practically no normal food and clothing on free sale even in industrial centres. The housing consisted mostly of communal flats and barracks. Air and water were just relatively suitable for men’s life.
And so what? How did all this concern namely the stability of the existing regime? Under the total control of special services, party, Komsomol, trade unions and others, in the absence of independent leaders and organizations – in one word in those real conditions - the protest did not go as a rule any further than malicious grumbling or bywords of this kind: “What is Polish solidarity? It’s when there is no meat in Sverdlovsk, but they go on strike in Gdansk”.
The generations of Chekists and Party activists had trampled down by that time practically all the shoots of the social initiative, and most of all of the active opposition. The defeat of dissident groups - this “fifth column” of the external enemy – has been completed under Andropov. Thereby, that very “occupation” of the country, that Bolsheviks literally were striving for, has been achieved (the German Nazi, strictly saying, picked up something from that experience). But on the other hand the popular refrain could be often heard in the innumerable queues: “If only there were no war…”
At the same time, there was no hunger as an occurrence. There were food markets, country plots and relatives in a village. In such naturally rich and enough fertile country as the URSS, the communists were suffice to slacken somewhat their pressure and the labour force itself found ways to subsist – exactly until pension. In general, the mass hunger could be provoked only advisedly. The Soviet power just did it this way from time to time.
As to the disorders and protest riots in the USSR during perestroika, they were linked undoubtedly with growth of discontent of the population. But it’s known for certain, that many of those actions (I agree with some experts, that the majority) were inspired and directed by party apparatus and special services according to their own scenarios.
Was there any real threat of social explosion or even civil war under Gorbachev, with what the Kremlin actively blackmailed the West and to what now Gajdar refers – is an open problem. In order to have serious conversation it’s necessary to promulgate, for example, some facts concerning the operational positions and activity of the KGB at enterprises and in work collectives, to investigate provocations inflicted, most likely, by party activists. That is to say, to follow the way of former socialist countries in Central Europe. Only then one will be able to make the concrete conclusions without going astray for juggling with the volumes of foreign credits used supposedly for saving perestroika.
Gajdar unfortunately evades the objective consideration of this issue, getting in general suppositions that hungry revolts could have taken place, but “troops would have never shot at people”. That’s namely why Politbureau, according to its protocols, has succumbed to panic and made concessions.
But firstly there were units really ready to shoot. Secondly, the KGB and MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) possessed already methods of crowd control without mass bloodshed. And thirdly, what of it was written in the documents of the leaders of CP USSR – organization permeated up to the top with lies, incompetence and intrigues. There was no postcommunist Nuernberg in the USSR, the full anatomy of the Soviet power remains to be a secret, the Russian sovietology has not plainly taken place. So, the fact concerning riots and how the nomenclature has prevented them – are still versions similar with the Kremlin propaganda of those and following years.
How much gold and corn was there, so that not to “take the pants off”?
Is the true balance of resources of the late USSR generally known? In Viennese residency where I was in charge of information work, I was once visited by the secret service man who claimed to stop the data collection on the local instances with the bosses of International corn council. I’m also aware, that in many countries including Canada, even the residents of the KGB were not admitted to the negotiations on corn import carried on by some persons arrived from Moscow – evidently special commissioners of the CC (Central Committee). All their deals, i.e. controlling the international financial and rough flows were kept strictly confidential even from the secret service officers. Thus, quite often we learnt with colleagues of some Instance’s actions from reliable sources in the enemy camp.
If somebody will affirm that Gajdar possessed or became later possessing the picture of these flows (including their final addressees), I could add that there was secret instruction in PGU and KGB not to forward especially precious and important information to Yeltsin and his people (it’s interesting when this restriction was abolished?). Where it was stored in fact – is a particular question. But it’s generally known that many highly explosive documents of CC and KGB were destroyed or stolen in 1991. The falsifications were also in common practice.
Gajdar acknowledges in one of his interviews that Western governments rose too high in five times the gold reserves of the USSR! Does not such “lack of information” give primarily a cause for estimation where have the four fifths of the soviet gold gone in the critical moment? Who and for what purpose has hidden it? Why don’t we consider the following variant: Moscow threw dust in Western governments’ and banks’ eyes and they willingly took part in this play. Troubled waters of the Communism’s downfall and the following “period of transition” was an ideal environment for such mega-machinations.
In October 1991 I was called out from Vienna to Moscow to the Lubyanka, not to Yasenevo, for clarification of some issues concerning the “gold of CPSU” (there was no actually other gold in the USSR). Somebody in the new government noticed the absence of those very reserves. Thus it’s not a chimera. The other thing, that since that time I have thoroughly forgotten all details.
But while the confrontation with the West was still continuing in 80s and nomenclature was keeping firmly the power, the Instance’s representatives announced confidently at the meetings with personnel of the secret service regarding the counteraction of the American SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative): “We’ll take our pants off, but we’ll go spaceward”. They’ve already started the realization of such “conception”, knowing well that mobilization potential of the USSR was rather high. And it was possible to increase during not one decade expansion on all continents and in near-earth space, what Gorbachev initially started to implement. In any case there was nobody inside the country who could prevent it.
The defeat was military
But things turned to be much worse at the external front. What I had an occasion to observe together with my colleagues through the various KGB’s, GRU’s, MVD’s channels and so forth let us to conclude: the USSR fall a victim, primarily of military or military-political defeat.
The West in the 80s contrary to the Kremlin’s accounts, managed to consolidate, mobilize its energy and launch a counter-offensive. Let’s remember the appeals of President Reagan – there were not only ideological manifests, but directions to his own and allied national security.
The deployment of Euromissiles in response to the deployment of SS-20 and partly to the soviet reckless schemes in Africa and Middle East witnesses the readiness of the USA and NATO to go into escalation and maximum risk or even direct collision.
According to those times estimates of PGU, the NATO “double decision” has buried the traditional soviet line of military-political blackmail of the West Europeans. It has become clear that it was impossible to split the North-Atlantic alliance by intimidation and flirtation with the latter (and first of all with numerous friends among “left wing”). The USSR strategy and policy grinded during decades has suddenly “poured down”.
Military catastrophes were immediately outlined in other regions. As far as one could judge the Americans aimed at facing Moscow and its allies each time the inevitability of forthcoming defeat unless it retreats.
Moreover the USA proceeded to what one could call a coercive exhaust. Their military activity has sharply risen along the perimeter of the USSR and OVD frontiers, erasing the brink between the current military activity and real attack. One of the victims of that tensest situation (the Cuba crisis of 1962 with its acuity left far behind) was the South Korean “Boeing”, brought down above Sakhalin in 1983.
It’s clear that everything interlaced in a tangle together with growing pressure in trade-economic and technological spheres, aggravation of psychological and informational wars, as well as an exasperation of veiled fight of secret services. The cold war was waging with highest tension of forces in all spheres and often on the verge of fatal risk.
However, the decisive link was without doubt a military-coercive one. Only when the external enemy demonstrated in practice his military superiority and determination to realize it in full scale, the soviet expansionism cracked and the collapse of the whole “world socialist system” began. The violence could somehow keep it in obedience and even enlarge regardless the economic, technological and cultural backwardness of the USSR, various “deficits” and “rates decrease”. But when Moscow was deprived of the big baton, the whole building has crashed down quickly.
I consider the turning point to be connected in particular with dismissal of the Defense Minister Sokolov and a group of military leaders after Matias Rust had landed in the Red Square in May 1987. As early as several months before there were a rumour that the Instance (i.e. Gorbachev, Shevarnadze and Yakovlev) “will throw under tank” the military because they “made a mess of Afghanistan” and did not provide an expected success in different regions of the world. And here the moment has come. I remember a phrase for Krutchkov’s telegram forwarded to our Brussels residency a couple hours later after appearing on all TV screen of the eccentric German: “You’ll see yourself what political importance is attached to this fact…”
The reaction of the Kremlin was typically soviet-nomenclature, that is to say it was dictated by no means by national interests, but by group and clannish ones. Gorbachev and others were given occasion to strike a blow for the defense establishment and thereby to redistribute in their favour the power and control over resources. At the same time the Kremlin took out of the context the nation as self-dependant political factor. The well-grounded assurance existed that our man would not desert to NATO and rebel against his masters. That is why the main thing - to overpass their own brothers-in-nomenclature.
Having realized and even literally heard from the Western leaders, that former count on military force was beaten and that persistence was fraught with rough sanctions, Gorbachev resolutely began to “pour off” the USSR positions. The diplomats had to formalize all this in international negotiations. Such turn of events has acutely disorientated and demoralized the majority of the soviet generals and “defense”. The Caucasian conflict was required to the military (originated incidentally not without Gorbachev’s participation) to make again the Kremlin their hostage and to restore their positions in the country and abroad.
The European building” was destroyed because of money
“Political-diplomatic offensive” was put forward by the Kremlin as an alternative after a failure of global military-political strategy. It consisted, first of all, in assignment of national unity to the Germans from Moscow’s hands. It was expected that in 1990 the left wing, that was friendly force one way or another, would come to power at parliamentary elections in GDR and FRG. The process of reunion would have started step-by-step at this basis in Germany which would have settled accounts with Moscow through credits and investments plus distancing from NATO. In the Kremlin one also hoped that the USSR slightly “turned pink” by that time would have been more acceptable partner for Europe that could have secured a foundation for the notorious “European building” as a counterbalance to the USA and NATO.
This plan has also collapsed because of the active resistance of the Americans and their main allies. Thus, the Kohl’s government entered middle 90s into all-German financial alliance with exchange of eastern mark to western mark at the rate of exchange 1 to 1. The population of the GDR took Kohl’s side and the question of Germany’s unity has been decided not at all in accordance with Moscow’s scheme. That was, possibly, the brightest episode of the direct influence of economy to the policy of a country at that time.
The appearance of independent Russian Federation as inheritress, i.e. internationally legal reincarnation of the USSR meant for the USA and NATO first of all the radical reduction of nuclear potential aimed at them and gigantic geopolitical gain. The strengthening and broadening of this gain were following, that can be distinctly seen through the whole Eltzin’s government, however chaotic it looks by itself. The question is in accelerated evacuation of Soviet/Russian military troops from Central Europe, consent for NATO expansion, continuation of bi- and multilateral disarmament and others. The military policy of the USA and NATO overrode by its consistency and succession all post-soviet upheavals. The Gajdar’s version focused on the pangs of “transitional economy”, as he assumes them, looks that’s why not only incomplete, but discordant to the realities and sense of that period.
But that is not all.
Who has won in Russia?
But the regimes of the socialist countries were only affiliated societies of the soviet “head firm” under the name the USSR, weren’t they? However, the “decommunization” has seriously started neither in it, nor in RF yet. Instead of that the soviet nomenclature having avoided the full value legal treatment and sanctions, has rapidly intercepted real power and property.
They assert that only gradual reforms were possible in the USSR. It’s correct in itself as applied to the market infrastructure that has not been observed in reality in RF either, under the taken place nomenclature variant of “shock therapy”.
On the contrary the step-by-step approach to the economic reforms has taken place and has yielded in “new democracies” in Central Europe. But communism has been declared there outlawed at once, investigations of communist crimes have begun, lustration has been implemented. Precise legal and value criteria turned out to be of the primary importance. Thanks to that the role of those who could really ensure the process of national recovery and well-being began to grow in power and economy.
In contrast to that, RF and countries of CIS the substitution of necessary social-political clean up by nomenclature restoration with conglomeration of quasi-democratic props has taken place. Furthermore, it remained itself, at closer examination, the major source of threat.
In fact, it was time for nomenclature as a class to rejuvenate and modernize. As a result the place of clumsy marshals was occupied by crafty lieutenant colonels, and bankrupt party bonzes were replaced by unsinkable Komsomol leaders. Having snatched the essence of the current moment they have become rich with lightning speed and provided themselves with absolute power. It has become again clear to them what was to defend and strive for in the near future and in prospects.
There are two forces that withstand the renovated nomenclature today - its own people and the democratic West. Hence is the return to the one in two, soviet in essence, state model: repressions inside the country and expansion beyond its bounds.
It’s not surprising that Russia is sliding again to totalitarianism and confrontation with the West. Former Bolsheviks remained at power. Vladimir Bukovsky has hit the mark asking: “Is fascism with human face possible?”
The power of nomenclature has become again unconcealed and frank under Putin. But preparation to that restoration – accumulation of resources and experience, formation of organizational forms and mechanisms of political and other of self-defense was already under late Gorbachev and Yeltsin. And it’s clear, that with participation of their companions-in-arms – voluntary or not, deliberate or blind. It’s possible that Gajdar and others were striving for better or tried to prevent the worst by forced actions. But as a result the main social and political diseases of Russia proved to be driven deeper, that’s why the necessary treatment can become more painful and dangerous.
Limits of the system
If we return now to economy, it has been already proved long ago that in its normal and vital shape it is being formed only in open society with absolute guarantees of individual rights, including right of property, in all its diversities. Rates are rates, but the logic of the deepening of market relations (the country was not born in 1991) will inevitably pose the question of full compensation to million victims of communism, and consequently of responsibility of regime and its present successors. Moscow has paid some – still tsarist – debts to Frenchmen and Belgians.
At the same time it’s clear that compensation per sample of the former socialist countries or post-was Germany – is the main awful thing for Russian “elite” and for its averting it will go to all length.
But on the other hand, much more flagrant is the situation, when Norilsk industrial complex built up at the cost of slave labour and prisoner’s lives, has become a source of means for newly-made “proprietors’” and “parliamentarians’” revelry abroad. In this example, as I think, the essence of the aggressive nomenclature parasitism reigned in RF is reflected. Alas, such is the result of half-measures and slyness of the policy of communists-reformers of 80s and 90s.
The world has lived several decades predominantly in the contest of the results of victory over Nazi Germany. The following epoch will be formed with completion of overcoming the remains of the soviet totalitarianism. Russians have so far a chance to make themselves a contribution to the solution of this task.
May 14, 2007
Victor Kalashnikov,
Lieutenant colonel of the Foreign Intelligence Service in retirement